Journal of Accountancy
Volume 30

Issue 5

Article 7

11-1920

Income-tax Department
Stephen G. Rusk

Follow this and additional works at: https://egrove.olemiss.edu/jofa
Part of the Accounting Commons, and the Taxation Commons

Recommended Citation
Rusk, Stephen G. (1920) "Income-tax Department," Journal of Accountancy: Vol. 30: Iss. 5, Article 7.
Available at: https://egrove.olemiss.edu/jofa/vol30/iss5/7

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Archival Digital Accounting Collection at eGrove. It
has been accepted for inclusion in Journal of Accountancy by an authorized editor of eGrove. For more information,
please contact egrove@olemiss.edu.

Income-tax Department
Edited

by

Stephen G. Rusk

During October, at least up to date, one treasury decision has been made.
It is No. 3071, and relates to the making of separate income-tax returns by
husband and wife domiciled in the state of Texas.
While the subject matter of this decision must of necessity be chiefly
a matter of importance to the accounting brethren of that state, it holds
some interest for all.
Texas by statute has definitely classified the separate property and the
income therefrom of husband and wife and that property and income which
belongs to them jointly. Attorney-general Palmer sets forth in treasury
decision 3071 how income from these two classes shall be returned for
federal tax purposes:
Briefly stated, income from the separate property of husband and wife,
except the increase, revenues and rental from lands, is community income,
and as such husband and wife may each return half as gross income.
Earnings of husband and wife, or of either of them, are community
income, and may also be divided half and half.
The income from property acquired by either as separate property after
their marriage is also community income and may be reported as is other
community income.
It will be noted that the ruling uses the word “may,” and therefore the
husband and wife may use their own discretion as to whether or not the
return of community income shall be on basis of one-half for each.
Office decision No. 610, explained and amplified by assistant reviewers’
memorandum No. 82, is given below. The decision of the department in this
case is not supported very well by the argumentative matter, as shown by
the conclusions derived from the supposititious example cited.
In the supposititious case a corporation was in possession of a surplus
of say $100,000.00 March 1, 1913. During the period ended December 31,
1919, it sustained a net loss of $5,000.00, thereby reducing its surplus to
$95,000.00. It declared a dividend of $25,000.00 some time in 1920, during
which year and up to date of which declaration its earnings are supposed to
have been $15,000.00. Hence, under the most limited interpretation the
corporation must have paid its dividend out of the $15,000.00 earned in 1920
and $10,000.00 out of its surplus earnings of March 1, 1913.
The department has ruled that because the corporation earned, say,
$5,000.00 in 1919 and $15,000.00 in 1920, only $5,000.00 of the $25,000.00
dividend could be considered to have been paid out of the surplus of March
1, 1913. Truly a remarkable decision reached by a unique method of
reasoning.
Among the other opinions given out during the month is legal opinion
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1035 (rev.), relating to shrinkage in value of securities and stocks. This
opinion is so logical and the argumentative matter proceeds so surely to the
correct conclusion, that it offers a marked contrast to office decision No. 610,
heretofore mentioned.
That a deductible loss has not been sustained because of the shrinkage
of value of stocks and securities owned, when actual disposition by sale or
otherwise has not taken place, is a most obvious fact. In the case described
in legal opinion No. 1035 (rev.), a corporation is stated to have sought to
deduct a loss of this nature when the substantial ownership of the stock and
securities had not changed, a subterfuge having been employed by the
formation of a new corporation having the same proportionate ownership
as the old corporation and by the transfer to this new corporation of the
said stock at a loss to the old corporation.
The above-mentioned decisions and opinions, together with a number of
others whose subject matter is of especial interest, are given below.

(T. D. 3071, September 18, 1920)
Income tax

Husband and wife—Community property—Opinion of attorney general
1. The earnings of husband and wife domiciled in Texas are community
income, and such husband and wife, in rendering separate income tax
returns, may each report as gross income one-half the total earnings of the
husband and wife.
2. The income from separate property, except the increase, rents and
revenues from lands, is community income, and therefore husband and wife
domiciled in Texas, in rendering separate income tax returns, may each
report as gross income one-half the total income from separate property,
except the increase, rents and revenues from land held separately.
3. The income from community property as defined in article 4622,
Vernon’s Sayles’s Statutes, is community income, and therefore husband and
wife domiciled in Texas, in rendering separate income tax returns, may each
report as gross income one-half the total income from such community
property.
There is given below in full for your information and guidance an
opinion rendered by the attorney general under date of August 24, 1920,
dealing with the right of husband and wife domiciled in certain states having
so-called “community property” laws to divide certain of their income for
the purpose of the income tax.
Department

of

Justice
Washington, August 24, 1920.

Dear Mr. Secretary: Further acknowledging receipt of your favor of
August 12, requesting my opinion on the three questions of law set forth
below, to wit:
1. Are the earnings of husband and wife domiciled in Texas community
income, and may they therefore in rendering separate income-tax returns
each report as gross income one-half of the total earnings of the husband
and wife?
2. Is the income from separate property, as defined in article 4021,
Vernon’s Sayles’s Statutes, 1918 edition, community income, and may there
fore husband and wife domiciled in Texas, in rendering separate income-tax
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returns, each report as gross income one-half of the total income from all
separate property owned by them?
3. Is the income from community property, as defined in article 4622,
Vernon’s Sayles’s Statutes, 1914 edition, community income, and may there
fore husband and wife domiciled in Texas, in rendering separate incometax returns, each report as gross income one-half of the total income from
community property?
I have the honor to advise you as follows:
The revenue act of 1918 levies a tax on the net income of every individual
(secs. 210 and 211). Net income is defined as gross income less deductions
allowed (see 212). Gross income is defined as follows (sec. 213) :
That for the purposes of this title (except as otherwise provided in sec.
233) the term “gross income”—
(a) Includes gains, profits and income derived from salaries, wages,
compensation for personal service (including in the case of the president
of the United States, the judges of the supreme and inferior courts of the
United States, and all other officers and employees, whether elected or
appointed, of the United States, Alaska, Hawaii, or any political sub
division thereof, or the District of Columbia, the compensation received as
such), of whatever kind and in whatever form paid, or from professions,
vocations, trades, businesses, commerce, or sales, or dealings in property,
whether real or personal, growing out of the ownership or use of or interest
in such property; also from interest, rent, dividends, securities, or the trans
action of any business carried on for gain or profit, or gains or profits, and
income derived from any source whatever. The amount of all such items
shall be included in the gross income for the taxable year in which re
ceived by the taxpayer, unless, under methods of accounting permitted
under subdivision (b) of section 212, any such amounts are to be properly
accounted for as of a different period.
The state constitution of Texas provides:
Art. VII, sec. 19, constitution 1845: All property, both real and per
sonal, of the wife, owned or claimed by her before marriage, and that ac
quired afterwards by gift, devise, or descent, shall be her separate property;
and laws shall be passed more clearly defining the rights of the wife in
relation as well as to her separate property as that held with her husband.
Laws shall also be passed providing for the registration of the wife’s
separate property.
The statutes of the state of Texas determining property rights of hus
band and wife are as follows (art. 4622, Vernon’s Sayles’s Statutes, 1914
edition) :
All property acquired by either the husband or wife during marriage,
except that which is the separate property of either one or the other, shall
be deemed the common property of the husband and wife, and during cover
ture may be disposed of by the husband only, provided, however, the per
sonal earnings of the wife, the rents from the wife’s real estate, the interest
on bonds and notes belonging to her, and dividends on stocks owned by her
shall be under the control, management and disposition of the wife alone,
subject to the provisions of article 4621, as hereinabove written; and further
provided that any funds on deposit in any bank or banking institution,
whether in the name of the husband or the wife, shall be presumed to be the
separate property of the party in whose name they stand, regardless of
who made the deposit, and unless said bank or banking institution is noti
fied to the contrary, it shall be governed accordingly in honoring checks and
orders against such account.
Article 4621, Vernon’s Sayles’s Statutes, 1918 edition:
All property, both real and personal, of the husband owned or claimed by
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him before marriage, and that acquired afterwards by gift, devise or
descent, as also the increase of all lands thus acquired, and the rents and
revenues derived therefrom, shall be his separate property. The separate
property of the husband shall not be subject to the debts contracted by the
wife, either before or after marriage, except for necessaries furnished
herself and children after her marriage with them. All property of the wife,
both real and personal, owned or claimed by her before marriage, and that
acquired afterwards by gift, devise, or descent, as also the increase of all
lands thus acquired, and the rents and revenues derived therefrom, shall be
the separate property of the wife. During marriage the husband shall have
the sole management, control and disposition of his separate property, both
real and personal, and the wife shall have the sole management, control and
disposition of her separate property, both real and personal ; provided, how
ever, the joinder of the husband in the manner now provided by law for
conveyance of the separate real estate of the wife shall be necessary to an
encumbrance or conveyance by the wife of her lands, and the joint signature
of the husband and wife shall be necessary to a transfer of stocks and bonds
belonging to her, or of which she may be given control by this act; pro
vided also, that if the husband shall have permanently abandoned his wife,
be insane, or shall refuse to join in such encumbrance, conveyance or trans
fer of such property, the wife may apply to the district court of the county
of her residence, and it shall be the duty of the court, in term time or
vacation, upon satisfactory proof that such encumbrance, conveyance or
transfer would be advantageous to the interest of the wife, to make an
order granting permission to make such encumbrance, conveyance or trans
fer without the joinder of her husband, in which event she may encumber,
convey or transfer said property without such joinder. Neither the separate
property of the wife, nor the rents from the wife’s separate real estate,
nor the interest on bonds and notes belonging to her, nor dividends on stocks
owned by her, nor her personal earnings, shall be subject to the payment
of debts contracted by the husband. The homestead, whether the separate
property of the husband or wife, or the community property of both, shall
not be disposed of except by the joint conveyance of both the husband and
the wife, except where the husband has permanently abandoned the wife, or
is insane, in which instance the wife may sell and make title to any such
homestead, if her separate property, in the manner herein provided for
conveying or making title to her other separate estate.
The community property of the husband and wife shall not be liable for
debts or damages resulting from contracts of the wife, except for neces
saries furnished herself and children, unless the husband joins in the
execution of the contract. Provided that her rights with reference to the
community property on permanent abandonment by the husband shall not be
affected by the preceding sentence.
Article 2469, Vernon’s Sayles’s Statutes:
Upon the dissolution of the marriage relation by death all property be
longing to the community estate of the husband and wife shall go to the
survivor, if there be no child or children of the deceased or their descend
ants; but if there be a child or children of the deceased, or descendant of
such child or children, then the survivor shall be entitled to one-half of said
property, and the other half shall pass to such child or children, or their
descendants. But such descendants shall inherit only such portion of said
property as the parent through whom they inherit would be entitled to if
alive.
The community property system prevails in Texas, Arizona, California,
Washington, Louisiana and New Mexico. It seems to have had its origin
in France and Spain, and to have been brought thence into our judicial
system.
Community property laws provide generally that all property acquired
368
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during marriage, by the industry and labor of either husband or wife or
both, together with the produce and increase thereof, belongs to both in equal
shares, during the continuance of the marital relation. It has its foundation
in the fact or the legal presumption that all property acquired during mar
riage, otherwise than by gift, devise, or descent, is acquired by the joint
efforts of husband and wife (Nickerson v. Nickerson, 65 Tex., 281, 284).
Their relation partakes of the nature of a partnership, in which each partner
may have separate estates or property, as well as common stock of acquisi
tions and gains. The business of the firm generally is transacted in the name
of the husband, and he prosecutes and defends its suits with the same effect
as if his partner were named in the case {Simpson v. Brotherton, 62 Tex.,
170), and although community property has not all the incidents of partner
ship property it has many of them, and is commonly spoken of as part
nership property {De Blanc v. Lynch & Co., 23 Tex., 25; Wilkinson v.
Wilkinson, 20 Tex., 237). In the conventional partnerships the gains of the
partners are in proportion to their respective shares of stock and services,
but in the conjugal partnerships the division is equal, though one may have
brought in the greater part, if not all of the property from which the profits
are derived, or may have contributed all his skill and services unaided by the
other {Wheat v. Owens, 15 Tex., 241; Routh v. Routh, 57 Tex., 589, 595).
The fact that one or the other of the spouses may do all the work does not
change the character of community property (Yates v. Houston, 3 Tex., 452,
454), and though the management and disposal of community property
during marriage are usually given to the husband, this is said to be for
reasons of public policy and social economy, and not on the grounds that
the husband has any greater interest in it than the wife. Section 4622,
Vernon’s Sayles’s Statutes, as amended in 1913, and as set forth above,
provides that the personal earnings of the wife, the rents from her estate,
the interest on bonds and notes belonging to her, and dividends owned on
stocks owned by her shall be under the control, management and disposition
of the wife alone; but the supreme court of Texas held in Tannehill v.
Tannehill (171 S. W., 1050) that such amendment did not change the char
acter of rents from the wife’s separate property, so as to make them her
separate property, but that they continued to belong to the community estate
and the husband was owner of one-half of same. (This before the amend
ment of sec. 4621 in 1917 made the rents from separate lands the separate
property of the owner of the land.)
In Tucker v. Carr (39 Tex., 98, 102) the court said: “It is well settled
that all property acquired during the marriage, whether by the labor of the
husband or the wife, or the joint labor of both, whether the title be made to
the husband or to the wife or to both jointly, is community property.” Also
see Cooke v. Bremond {27 Tex., 457).
In Holyoke v. Jackson (3 Pac., 841) the supreme court of Washington,
in defining community property rights in that state, held that the community
“is like a partnership, in that some property coming from or through one or
other or both of the individuals, forms for both a common stock which
bears the losses and receives the profits of its management and which is
liable for individual debts; but it is unlike in that there is no regard paid to
proportionate contribution, service, or business fidelity; that each individual
once in it is incapable of disposing of his or her interest, and that both are
powerless to escape from the relationship, to vary its terms, or to distribute
its assets or its profits. * * * In it the proprietary interest of husband
and wife are equal, and those interests do not seem to be united merely, but
unified.”
There are numerous decisions holding that the proportional interests of
husband and wife in community property are equal regardless of their in
dividual contributions.
In Merrill v. Moore (104 S. W., 514) the court said: “This community
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of interest is not made to depend upon the acquisition of the property during
the time the parties actually live together, nor upon the fact that there was
an equal amount of labor or capital contributed by the husband and wife
in its accumulation. It is the property acquired during the marriage (with
exceptions stated) that ‘shall be deemed the common property of husband
and wife, and the right to an equality of enjoyment and division thereof,
regardless of whether the one or the other has contributed little or nothing
to its acquisition’ is well recognized.” Also see Edwards v. Brown (68
Tex., 329) ; Saunders v. Isbell (24 S. W., 307) ; Barr v. Simpson (117 S. W.,
1041) ; Wright v. Hays admr. (10 Tex., 130) ; Zimpelman v. Robb (53
Tex., 274). That one-half of the common estate belongs to each spouse is
recognized in T. D. 2450, which determines the method of assessing estate
tax upon the estate of a decedent spouse.
The decisions in the various states seem to be unanimous on the proposi
tion that the earnings of both husband and wife during the marriage belong
to the community.
In Fennell v. Drinkhouse (131 Calif., 447), it was held that money
earned by the wife while living with her husband was community property,
the court saying: “The possession of community property by the wife is
the possession of the husband,” and in Martin v. Southern Pacific Co. (130
Calif., 285), holding that moneys received as damages for injury to the wife
are community property, it was said.
The services of the wife are a part of the earning power of the com
munity, and the earnings received for her services constitute community
property as much as do the earnings received for the services of the hus
band. If the injury had been received by the husband, it would not be con
tended that he could not recover for the damage sustained by the loss of
his earning capacity. In either case the earnings would be community prop
erty, and any act by which either husband or wife is deprived of the capacity
to render services diminishes the capacity to accumulate community property.
If the services voluntarily rendered by the wife obviate the necessity of
employing other assistance the amount of the community property is thereby
enhanced in the amount that would be required for such assistance. * * *
See also Washburn v. Washburn (9 Calif., 475).
Under the Louisiana statutes the profits of the industry of both spouses
and the fruits of their separate estates fall into the community. Succession
of Webre (49 La., 149; 22 So., 390) ; Knight v. Kaufman (105 La., 35;
29 So., 711) ; Manning v. Burke (107 La., 456; 31 So., 862). The decisions
of the supreme court of the state of Washington are to the same effect.
Abbott v. Weatherby (6 Wash., 507; 33 Pac., 1070); Yake v. Pugh (13
Wash., 78; 42 Pac., 528) ; Sherlock v. Denny (28 Wash., 170; 68 Pac., 452).
There are numerous decisions by the supreme court of Texas holding that in
Texas the earnings of the husband and wife are community property.
Cline v. Hackbarth (27 Tex., Civ. App., 391; 65 S. W., 1086) ; Johnson v.
Burford (39 Tex., 242) ; Pearce v. Jackson (61 Tex., 642); Cooke v.
Bremond (27 Tex., 457). In the latter case the court said:
Our whole system of marital rights is based upon the fact that acquisi
tions either of the joint or separate labor or industry of the husband or wife
become common property; and as a general rule, deducible from this princi
ple, all property acquired by purchase or apparent onerous title, whether the
conveyance be in the name of the husband or of the wife, or in the names
of both, is prima facie presumed to belong to the community.
Under the laws of the various states wherein the community property
system obtains, the earnings of separate property of the spouses with such
exceptions as are specifically provided for by statute, are community prop
erty. See Barrv. Simpson (117 S. W., 1040, Tex.) and Hayden v. McMillan
(23 S. W., 430, Tex.).
The latter case was decided when article 2851, revised statutes of Texas,
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provided that all the property owned by the wife before marriage or ac
quired afterwards by gift, devise, or descent, and the “increase of all lands
thus acquired” should be the separate property of the wife. And the court
held that rents accruing on the separate lands of the wife were community
property and subject to garnishment for community debts. This case also
establishes the proposition that such community interest attaches the moment
the property comes into existence, the court saying: “The moment the rents
become due they are disconnected from the land and become personal prop
erty, and, being acquired by the joint labors of the married couple put forth
during the marital relation, they must necessarily be community.”
From the above authorities I am convinced that under the law of Texas
the earnings of the husband and wife belong to them jointly in equal shares;
that the community interest attaches as soon as the right to the wages comes
into existence; and that the increase and revenues from the separate property
of each spouse except the increase, rents and revenues from lands, is also
community property in which the interests of husband and wife are equal.
These propositions being established it follows that the earnings of hus
band and wife and the revenues from their separate personal property are
community “income,” under the provisions of the act of February 24, 1919.
Gross income under the terms of the act includes “gains, profits and income
derived from salaries, wages, compensation for personal services of whatever
kind and in whatever form paid, or from professions, vocations, trades,
businesses, commerce, or sales, or dealings in property, whether real or per
sonal, growing out of the ownership or use of or interest in such property.”
The law of Texas presumes that the earnings of the husband and wife
are the product of their joint labor and rests the ownership of same in the
community; they are therefore community “income,” to wit, “gains, profits
and income” of the community, “derived from salaries, wages, compensation
for personal services,” * * * professions, vocations, as the case may be.
Under the statutes of Texas heretofore set forth, the separate property
of the spouses is defined as that “owned or claimed by him (or her) before
marriage, and that acquired afterwards by gift, devise or descent,” and also
“the increase of all lands thus acquired, and the rents and revenues derived
therefrom.” It is to be noted that the increase of separate personal property
and the revenues derived therefrom are not the separate property of the owner
of the personalty, but are community property. Carr v. Tucker (42 Tex.,
330) ; Epperson v. Jones (65 Tex., 425) ; Barr v. Simpson (117 S. W.,
1041). They are therefore “income” to the community, to wit, “gains,
profits and income * * * from businesses, commerce, or sales or dealings
in property * * * growing out of the ownership or use of or interest in
such property.”
Since one-half of all community property vests in each spouse, it follows
that one-half of the increase and revenues from separate property of the
spouses, except increase and rents and revenues from lands, is income to each
of said spouses.
Community property under the laws of Texas belongs jointly to husband
and wife; it follows that the income therefrom accrues to husband and wife
in equal shares. I therefore conclude:
1. That the earnings of husband and wife domiciled in Texas are com
munity income, and such husband and wife in rendering separate incometax returns may each report as gross income one-half the total earnings of
the husband and wife.
2. That the income from separate property, except the increase, rents
and revenues from lands, is community income, and that therefore husband
and wife domiciled in Texas in rendering separate income-tax returns may
each report as gross income one-half the total income from separate prop
erty, except the increase, rents and revenues from land held separately.
3. That the income from community property as defined in article 4622,
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Vernon’s Sayles’s Statutes, quoted above, is community income, and that
therefore husband and wife domiciled in Texas in rendering separate incometax returns may each report a^ gross income one-half the total income from
such community property.
Respectfully,
A. Mitchell Palmer,
Hon. David F. Houston,
Attorney General
Secretary of the Treasury.
Office Decision No. 610
Section 201, article 1541: dividends
The M company operated at a profit during the years 1913, 1917 and 1919,
but sustained losses during the years 1914, 1915, 1916 and 1918, so that for
the entire period of 1913 to 1919, inclusive, its books showed a net operating
deficit.
Having on hand a large surplus, accumulated prior to 1913, the company
declared a dividend in 1920, payable out of such surplus, and it is contended
that this dividend is exempt from tax, since the books of the company show
a net operating deficit for the period subsequent to 1913, and notwithstanding
the fact that a profit was realized during each of the years 1913, 1917 and
1919.
While not specifically so stated it is assumed that the dividend was paid
in cash. In accordance with paragraph (b) of section 201 of the revenue
act of 1918, it will, therefore, be deemed to have been paid out of earnings
accumulated since February 28, 1913, in so far as such earnings were suf
ficient for its payment. The distribution will not be subject to tax in the
hands of the stockholders to the extent that it was made from earnings or
profits accumulated prior to March 1, 1913. The operating losses of the
company sustained in 1914, 1915, 1916 and 1918 are not to be charged against
the earnings or profits of any particular year, and the fact that there were
such losses does not prevent or alter the application of the rule that the
dividend will be deemed to have been paid from earnings accumulated since
February 28, 1913, as provided in section 201 of the act. Accordingly the
dividend is taxable to the recipient stockholders at the rates applicable for
1920, the year in which paid, to the extent that it represents a distribution
of the current undivided earnings accumulated since February 28, 1913.

Assistant Reviewer’s Memo. No. 82
Section 201, article 1541: dividends
The committee is in receipt of a request for advice as to the correctness
of the ruling published as office decision 610, bulletin 31-20-1098, relative
to the taxability of the earnings of a corporation which in some years sub
sequent to 1913 has had large losses and in another year large profits.
In the judgment of the committee and upon the facts in the instant case
on which office decision 610 was based the correctness of the ruling depends
upon the meaning to be attached to the words “accumulated since February
28, 1913.” The word “accumulated” as used in this sense means, in the
judgment of the committee, profits which have been earned and not dissi
pated by subsequent losses. While it is recognized that assets cannot be
earmarked as representing earnings of any particular year, it is a fair
assumption that the earliest surplus of a corporation is likely to be repre
sented in its balance sheet by fixed assets, while the later earnings are more
apt to be represented by liquid assets. Consequently, any losses sustained
in a given year will be met out of the most recent earnings embraced in its
surplus. It follows that profits of any year cannot be diminished by prior
losses, but it is fair to assume that such earnings, to the extent necessary, will
go to satisfy subsequent losses.
To illustrate what is meant, let us take a supposititious case: A cor-
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poration had on March I, 1913, a surplus of $100,000; during the remainder
of 1913 it earned $10,000; from January 1, 1914, to December 31, 1916, it
lost $25,000; during 1917 it earned $15,000; during 1918 it lost $10,000;
during 1919 it earned $5,000, and in 1920 declared a dividend of $25,000, its
earnings for the current year up to the date of the dividend being $15,000.
Tabulated with the fluctuations of surplus involved, this would show as
follows:
Earnings.

Losses.
Mar.
Dec.
Jan. 1/14 to Dec. 31/16. $25,000 Dec.
15,000
Dec.
Jan. 1 to Dec. 31/18.. 10,000 Dec.
5,000
Dec.

Mar. 1 to Dec. 31/13.. $10,000

Jan. 1 to Dec. 31/17..

Jan. 1 to Dec. 31/19..
Jan. 1/20 to date of
dividend................ 15,000

Surplus.
1/13.. $100,000
31/13. 110,000
31/16.
85,000
31/17. 100,000
31/18.
90,000
31/19.
95,000

Dividend, 1920 .............. $25,000

The most recent loss shown is that of 1918. This, of course, was met
out of earlier earnings, and the corporation must have on hand at the
present time the $5,000 earned in 1919 as well as the $15,000 earned in the
current year. Of the $15,000 earned in 1917, $10,000 was lost in 1918,
leaving it with $5,000 earnings of 1917 still on hand. The $15,000 of 1920
earnings, together with the $5,000 of 1919 earnings and the $5,000 remaining
of 1917 earnings covers the dividend of $25,000, showing that all of the
dividend was paid out of earnings accumulated since March 1, 1913, notwith
standing the fact that the company’s surplus on December 31, 1919, was
$5,000 less than it was on March 1, 1913. From this it might be argued that
necessarily, since its surplus on December 31, 1919, was less than that of
March 1, 1913, any distribution in excess of the earnings of 1920 must have
come out of the March 1 surplus. This, however, is a fallacy, since there
is no obligation to recognize for tax purposes the surplus of March 1, 1913,
as capital which must be made good before there can be any distribution
of profits.
Upon the figures given in the letter, which was the basis of office decision
610, the only profits earned since February 28, 1913, which had not been
dissipated by subsequent losses, were the amounts earned in 1919 plus any
earnings of 1920 up to the date of the dividend. These amounts are the only
amounts which if distributed would be subject to tax.

Assistant Reviewer's Report No. 269
Section 214(a) 4, 5, 6, article 141: losses. (Also section 214(a) 1,
article 111)
A loss incurred by a corporation through the embezzlement of securities
held in bailment by it is an allowable deduction from gross income of the
year in which demand was made by the bailors for the return of the
securities and the replacement made by the company.
The committee has had under consideration the appeal of the M company
from a ruling of the income-tax unit disallowing a deduction from gross
income for the year 1917, on account of loss accruing out of an embezzle
ment occurring over a period of years from 1908 to 1916.
In view of the circumstances of this case the committee was in doubt
as to whether law opinion 845 (ruling 6-19-279; p. 118, cumulative bulletin,
December, 1919), is applicable, and requested the opinion of the solicitor
upon the various legal questions involved. It is now in receipt of a memo
randum from him as follows:
Opinion has been requested as to the deductibility of amounts paid out
in 1917 to cover the embezzlement in prior years of securities held by a
company in bailment.
Section 12(a) of the revenue act of 1916, as amended by the revenue
act of 1917, provides:
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. In the case of a corporation, joint stock company or association, or
insurance company organized in the United States, such net income shall be
ascertained by deducting from the gross amount of its income received
within the year from all sources. * * *
First. All the ordinary and necessary expenses paid within the year in
the maintenance and operation of its business and properties. * * *
Second. All losses actually sustained and charged off within the year
and not compensated by insurance or otherwise. It appears that the company
held certain securities owned by four of its clients for the purpose of col
lecting income and remitting the same from time to time to the owners of
the securities, such securities to be returned to the owners upon demand.
During the years from 1908 to 1916, inclusive, an officer of the company,
by means of forged receipts, appropriated these securities to his own use.
This misappropriation of the securities was not discovered until 1917,
whereupon the company, at the demand of the clients for delivery of their
securities, replaced the securities at a total of 8x dollars. The company
claims a deduction, in computing the net income for 1917, to the amount of
dollars, representing the difference between the cost of the replaced
securities and the claims against insurance companies and unliquidated
assets of the embezzler.
By law opinion 845 it was held that a loss incurred by a corporation
through the embezzlement of its funds is an allowable deduction from gross
income for the year in which the embezzlement occurred, on the ground
that the loss is sustained when the embezzlement occurs, and that the time
of the discovery of the loss bears no relation to the date it was sustained.
In the instant case, however, the embezzled securities were not the property
of the corporation, but were held by it in bailment, to be returned to the
owners upon demand. At the time of the embezzlement the amount of the
loss to the company could not be determined, for it was controlled by the
replacement cost of the securities at the date of demand by the owners.
The claims against the company might have been waived by the clients, and
in that case the company would have sustained no loss. Furthermore, the
liability of the company to the clients on account of the loss of the prop
erty held in bailment was not certain and might have been contested, the
company contending that in a bailment for mutual benefit it is held to the
exercise of ordinary care in relation to the subject matter thereof and is
responsible only for ordinary negligence. New York Cent. R. Co. v. Lock
wood,
Wall. 357; Bleakley v. New York, 39 Fed. 807; Fairmount Coal
Co. v. Jones, etc., Co., 134 Fed. 711; Smith v. British Steamship Co., 123
Fed. 76.
The amount expended by the M company was in fact a payment in
settlement of a legal liability. The right of action of the clients accrued
when the demand was made for the return of the securities, and the liability
of the company was incurred on that date. Stevens v. Stevens, 132 Mo. A.
624; Walker v. Bement, 94 N. E. 339; Woods v. Latta, 3 Mont. 9; Brown v.
Cook, 9 John 361. In Walker v. Bement, supra, the court, speaking of the
liability of a bailee, said:
A loan of corporate stock to be returned on demand only obligates the
borrower to return it on demand, and the right of the lender to money for
the stock does not arise until failure to return on demand, and the right to
the money arises out of the breach of the obligation to return on demand.
In view of this opinion, in which the committee concurs, it is held that
the loss incurred by the M company through the embezzlement of securities
held in bailment by the company is an allowable deduction from gross
income in 1917, the year in which demand was made by the bailors for the
return of the securities, and the replacement made by the company.
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Legal Opinion No. 1035 (Rev.)
Section 214(a) 4, 5, 6, article 144: shrinkage in securities and stocks. (Also
section 233, article 542.) (Also section 234, article 564)
Income tax—Act of October 3, 1913, section G(b). Revenue act of 19x6,
section 12(a) second, section 12(a) third
(1) Where a new corporation is organized having the same stock
holders with the same stockholdings as the old corporation, to which the old
corporation transfers a large amount of stocks and bonds at a loss, less than
1% of the purchase price being paid in cash and the balance being paid for
notes secured by the stocks and bonds sold, possession of which was retained
by the old corporation with power of sale in case of default, the new cor
poration having no other assets, the whole transaction will be regarded as a
sham and a subterfuge to evade taxation and the loss will be denied. Article
148, regulations 33, revised; article 144, regulations 45; article 77, regula
tions 41.
(2) A corporation derives no gain from a sale of its own stock pre
viously purchased by it. Article 542, regulations 45. But interest actually
paid in cash or its equivalent by stockholders on sales of stock on credit
to them is taxable income to the corporation.
(3) A manufacturer and dealer in merchandise which also deals
largely in securities is entitled to deduct in full interest on indebtedness
secured by such securities under section G(b) of act of October 3, 1913.
Such taxpayer is not entitled to deduct such interest in full under section
12(a) third of the revenue act of 1916, since it is not “a dealer only” in such
securities. Law opinion 621.
On examination of the income and excess profits tax returns of the M
company for the years 1912 to 1917, inclusive, several questions have been
submitted for ruling. They will be treated separately.
(1) The deduction of a loss of 475x dollars on securities sold to N
company.
The M company, engaged in an industrial business, owned certain stocks
and bonds which it carried as liquid reserves available for opportune pur
chases of material. Most of these securities were listed on the New York
stock exchange. They had cost (or were worth on March 1, 1913) 1,764x
dollars; and the aggregate market value in November, 1917. was about
475x dollars less than this cost.
The stockholders of the M company established a new corporation,
hereinafter called the N company, having the same stockholders with the
same proportionate stock holdings as the M company. The N company then
bought the stocks and bonds above mentioned from the M company at market
prices. It paid the M company 12x dollars cash received from the sale of
its capital stock, and gave for the balance of the purchase price its demand
notes bearing 6 per cent interest with these same securities as collateral.
It had no other assets.
The apparent effect of this transaction is to entitle the M company to a
deduction of 475x dollars as a loss and to substitute admissible assets in
place of inadmissible assets in the computation of invested capital.
Section 12(a) second, of the revenue act of 1916, permits a corporation
to deduct from gross income “all losses actually sustained and charged off
within the year and not compensated by insurance or otherwise.” Regula
tions 33, revised, requires that losses must be “evidenced by closed and
completed transactions.”
Art. 148. Shrinkage in securities.—A corporation possessing securities
such as stocks and bonds cannot allowably deduct from gross income any
amount claimed as a loss on account of the shrinkage in value of such
securities through fluctuations of the market or otherwise; the only loss to
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be allowed in such cases is that actually suffered when the securities mature
or are disposed of.
Substantially the same rule is repeated in article 144 of regulations 45.
In the present transaction the identity of stock ownership of the two
corporations has an important bearing on the questions of deductible loss.
It is clear that under article 77 of regulations 41 these corporations would
be deemed affiliated and required to file a consolidated return for excess
profits tax purposes. In such case the intercorporate transactions would be
eliminated and no loss could be claimed, and there would be no change in
invested capital because of this transaction. But even as to income tax it
is clear that because of the identity of ownership of the stock the M com
pany continued to be in practical control of the N company, and therefore
in control of the securities themselves, so long as they remained in the
hands of the N company. This form of disposition by the M company could
have had no other purpose than to postpone the realization of gain or loss
on these securities; otherwise the M company would simply have sold them
on the stock exchange.
The retention of control, moreover, not only postponed liquidation but
preserved the power of the M company to undo the entire transaction and
revest itself with the securities without violating anybody’s substantial
rights or interests. This power was made more effective by the retention
of the custody of the securities as collateral to the notes with power to
sell in case of default.
Besides retaining the practical control of the securities the M company
continued to carry the risk of their depreciation or loss; for although
it had the absolute obligation of the N company in the form of the latter’s
notes, the only assets behind the notes were these securities. The fact that
the risk was theoretically lessened by the payment of 12x dollars cash is
not very material, since that payment, received indirectly from the com
pany’s own stockholders, was less than 1% of the value of the securities.
As a result of the transaction, founded upon joint proportional owner
ship of the stock of both companies, the M company retained substantially,
and it was the whole purpose of the plan that it should retain any advantage
from a rise in value of these securities; and for the same reason it retained
the risk of loss. It is, therefore, clear that disregarding form and looking
at substance the realization of this loss has been postponed, and the trans
action is not a closed and completed one. The whole procedure is obviously
a sham and device to evade taxation.
In such cases the taxing authorities are not bound to recognize the forms
adopted by the taxpayer to evade the imposition of taxes where such forms
do not reflect an actual change in substance. (H. M. Louden Sons Lumber
Company v. Elmer Township (Mich., 1900), 81 N. W. 965; Montgom
ery v. Marshall County (Iowa, 1911), 129 N. W. 329; Sisler v. Foster
(Ohio, 1905), 74 N. E. 639; Shotwell v. Moore (1888), 129 U. S.
590). The situation in this case does not indicate a bona fide change in
legal relations made by the taxpayer to reduce taxes, but is mere sham and
subterfuge which accomplishes no actual or substantial change in conditions
and leaves realization of gain or loss for future determination. The loss
apparently realized here is a mere bookkeeping transaction and not the result
of a bona fide sale or other disposition of the securities in question. The
claim of the M company for the deduction of the loss of 475x dollars must,
therefore, be denied.
(2) The question of profits on the sale of stock to various employees.
The revenue agent included 4x dollars in gross income for 1912 and
47x dollars in gross income for 1917 on account of profits from the sale
of treasury stock previously acquired by the company by purchase and
resold to employees at an advanced price. The taxpayer claims that these
so-called sales were in fact merely options, and that for that reason it
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should not be required to account for any gain. The nature of the agree
ment, however, becomes immaterial in view of article 542 of regulations 45,
promulgated since the revenue agent’s report. That article provides in part:
If, for the purpose of enabling a corporation to secure working capital
or for any other purpose, the stockholders donate or return to the corpora
tion to be resold by it certain shares of stock of the company previously
issued to them, or if the corporation purchased any of its stock and holds
it as treasury stock, the sale of such stock will be considered a capital trans
action, and the proceeds of such sale will be treated as capital, and will not
constitute income to the corporation.
This principle applies with equal force to the revenue act of 1916 as
amended and to the corporation tax act of 1909. No amount, therefore
should be included in gross income for 1912 or 1917 as profit from the sale
of treasury stock.
(3) From further facts submitted by the taxpayer since the rendering
of law opinion 1035, it appears that stock was sold by the M company to three
of its stockholders at various times as follows:
In 1909 the corporation entered into an agreement with B, one of its
employees, with respect to the sale of ten shares of its stock which pre
viously had been issued for cash at par, and had then been donated back
to the company by its stockholders for sale or other disposition for its
benefit. By this agreement of sale the company agreed to issue to B ten
shares of its capital stock for which he agreed to pay in cash in 1914, 50x
dollars, and 6% per annum thereon from the date of the issuance of the stock
to date of such payment, with the proviso, however, that in the event that in
1914 B desired to surrender his rights to the stock he might do so, and there
upon be repaid any amounts paid on account, and be released from any
further liability to the company on account of the purchase price. The
ten shares of stock were issued as provided in the agreement, and were held
by the company as security. In 1914, B having made no payment whatever
under the terms of the agreement, entered into a new agreement canceling
the old agreement. By the terms of this new agreement B agreed to pur
chase the ten shares of stock in question and to pay therefor in 1919 the
amount of 65x dollars. The difference between the original price and the
new price, viz.: 15x dollars, is, of course, 6% interest on 50X dollars for
five years.
A similar contract of sale was entered into by C, another stockholder.
In this case, however, C having made no payment whatever under his
original agreement, the new agreement was not executed until 1915, ap
proximately one year after the maturity of the old agreement. By the terms
of the new agreement C, as in the case of B, agreed to pay 65x dollars for
ten shares of stock which he had previously agreed to purchase for 50x
dollars.
Upon reconsideration it is held that the corporation received no. income
in 1914 or 1915 with respect to the above two items of so-called interest.
An examination of the original agreements of sale, which are not set forth
in detail herein, shows that the obligation on the part of the stockholders
was to pay the 6% interest not annually, semi-annually or at any specified
time during the life of the contract, but at the expiration thereof, i. e.,
as part of the purchase price of such stock. There is no indication that the
parties intended that the corporation would be able to insist upon payment
of the interest at any time prior to the expiration of the time fixed by the
agreements. The new agreements in each case canceled and annulled the
old one, the corporation specifically relinquishing any claim that it may have
had. It must be concluded, therefore, that the corporation did not in 1914
or 1915, at the time the new agreements were made, receive payment of the
interest in cash or its equivalent. The new contracts themselves cannot be
considered the equivalent of cash, for they provide that if the purchase price
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is not paid at the new due dates, the certificates of stock shall be surrendered
to the company and canceled, and the company shall repay to the stock
holders any amounts which they have paid on account.
In the case of the sale of stock by the corporation to A, another stock
holder, the facts were somewhat different. In that case a similar contract
of purchase was entered into in 1912, maturing in 1917. But A, instead of
entering into a new agreement at the expiration of the old one, exercised
his right to purchase the stock by executing and delivering to the company
his collateral promissory note for 65x dollars, the stipulated purchase price
50x dollars, plus 6% interest thereon for five years, amounting to 15x
dollars. The time of payment of this note does not appear, but so far as
the evidence submitted is concerned, there is nothing to show that the note
was not good and collectible. In this case the corporation received cash
or its equivalent, and the note should be taken at its fair discount value
when received by the corporation. So much of that fair discount value as
represents the 15x dollars interest should have been included in the gross
income of the corporation for the year 1917.
(4) The revenue agent disallowed certain deductions of interest for
1913, 1914, 1915 and 1916.
In each of these years the agent permitted the deduction of the full
amount of interest deductible according to the terms of the statute then
in force, unless a further allowance is permitted under the provisos quoted
below. Section G(b) of the act of October 3, 1913, reads in part:
Provided, that in case of indebtedness wholly secured by collateral the
subject of sale in ordinary business of such corporation, joint stock company,
or association, the total interest secured and paid by such company, cor
poration, or association within the year on any such indebtedness may be
deducted as a part of its expenses of doing business.

Section 12(a) third, of the revenue act of 1916, reads in part:
Provided further, that in the case of indebtedness wholly secured by
property collateral, tangible or intangible, the subject of sale or hypotheca
tion in the ordinary business of such corporation, joint stock company, or
association as a dealer only in the property constituting such collateral or
in loaning the funds thereby procured the total interest paid by such cor
poration, company, or association within the year on any such indebtedness
may be deducted as a part of its expenses of doing business, but interest on
such indebtedness shall only be deductible on an amount of such indebted
ness not in excess of the actual value of such property collateral.
This company was originally organized to buy, sell and manufacture
certain commodities, but in 1909 it greatly enlarged its powers so that it
was expressly authorized to purchase, hold and dispose of stocks, bonds
and other securities, and to borrow money on notes, bonds or other deben
tures. The company contends that the items of interest disallowed are
paid on indebtedness of the company wholly secured by collateral consisting
of miscellaneous stocks and bonds of other corporations, and in part by
warehouse receipts for merchandise dealt in by the company. The revenue
agent’s report supports this statement of the taxpayer. It is said on page 4:
The company uses its stocks and bonds held in other companies as
collateral.
The company’s returns from 1912 to 1917 disclose that large amounts
were received as dividends, and that from year to year such amounts
fluctuated greatly, indicating in a general way considerable dealing in stocks.
It would appear, therefore, that stocks and bonds are the subject of sale
in the ordinary business of the corporation. This is, of course, true of the
merchandise which in some cases furnished the security. It, therefore, seems
clear that this is indebtedness wholly secured by collateral the subject of
sale in the ordinary business of the corporation, and that interest paid

378

Income-tax Department
thereon is, therefore, deductible in full under the provisions of the act of
October 3, 1913. This settles the question of interest for the years 1913,
1914 and 1915 in taxpayer’s favor.
The provisions of the revenue act of 1916, however, are much stricter,
and the benefits of this proviso are confined to interest paid on indebtedness
wholly secured by collateral the subject of sale or hypothecation in the
ordinary business of the corporation as a dealer only in the property con
stituting the collateral. This company is not only a dealer but a manu
facturer, and is not primarily a dealer in securities but only incidentally a
dealer in securities and primarily a dealer and manufacturer in certain
merchandise. It is not, therefore, entitled to the deduction of interest
under this proviso in 1916, except as to interest paid on indebtedness, if any,
secured by the hypothecation of merchandise or warehouse receipts therefor.
This view is supported by law opinion 621 (revoked on other grounds by
law opinion 634).

(Note:

L. O. 1035 (rev.) supersedes O. 1035, ruling 21-20-954.)

Assistant Reviewer’s Report No. 272
Section 214(a) 8, article 168: depreciation of drawing and models
Appeal of the M company, in re disallowance of certain claimed values
as of March 1, 1913, of plant and equipment as a basis for subsequent de
preciation allowance.
The committee has had under consideration the appeal of the M company,
from the action of the income-tax unit in disallowing certain claimed values
as of March 1, 1913, of plant and equipment as a basis for subsequent
depreciation allowance.
It appears that it had been the practice of this company, which was
engaged in the manufacture of machinery, to charge to expense the cost of
tracings, patterns and flasks necessary in their business instead of capital
izing such items, and the question arises as to the inclusion of the value of
such items on March 1, 1913, in capital accounts for the purpose of deter
mining the proper basis for depreciation subsequent to that date.
The company had an appraisal made in 1912, which appraisal did not
include the items above enumerated. Although the letter transmitting the
appeal states that the propriety of the acceptance of this appraisal is one
of the questions submitted, it is understood that the unit concedes that in
the absence of other evidence this appraisal, less depreciation to March 1,
1913, should be accepted as the value on March 1, 1913, of items included
therein, in which view the committee concurs. As before stated, this ap
praisal did not include tracings, drawings, patterns and flasks, and in 1920
the company had an appraisal made as of the date of March 1, 1913, of the
value of these items not previously included. It appears that the drawings
are dated, and that the only properties included in the second appraisal, as
of March 1, 1913, are those tracings and drawings which can be identified
by date as being on hand March 1, 1913, and the patterns and flasks made
in conformity therewith.
The company states that from 1912 to 1916 it was engaged in repair
work which required no new equipment of the character sought to be valued,
and that in 1916 production was changed to machinery of a different char
acter, which manufacture continued up to practically the present time; that
the manufacture of the former machines has just been resumed, and that
consequently it is fairly demonstrated that all of such equipment must have
been on hand March 1, 1913. The committee is of the opinion that this is a
fair conclusion under the circumstances and should be admitted by the
bureau.
The second question is as to the method of determining the value on
March 1, 1913, of this equipment. It is manifest that the taxpayers and the
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bureau must constantly engage in the valuation of properties owned on
March 1, 1913, for the purpose of determining profit or loss on the sale
thereof, and it is the consistent rule to fix such values, even though no
appraisals were made on or about March I, 1913, by the best evidence which
can be arrived at and upon “any evidence which will reasonably and ade
quately make it appear.” (Article 1561, regulations 45.) The method
used by the appraisal company was to ascertain from data in their posses
sion the reproduction cost on March 1, 1913, of the equipment under con
sideration and to accept that, less depreciation from original acquisition, as
the true value of that date. This appears to the committee to be a fair and
reasonable method of determining value of equipment and to establish such
value as nearly as it is possible now to do. In the absence of any evidence,
therefore, showing that the values so established were not fair values as of
that date, the committee recommends their acceptance.
There is a question, however, in this connection not raised by the unit
to which its attention is invited. To the extent that such items of equip
ment were charged to expense during the years from 1909 to 1912, inclusive,
such charges were erroneous, and the income as reported for purposes of the
excise tax act of 1909, was incorrect. The company should, therefore, be
required as a condition to acceptance of these values to readjust its returns
for those years by the inclusion in income of the cost so ascertained of all
articles here authorized to be treated as capital from March 1, 1913.
The committee therefore recommends, in the absence of evidence tending
to controvert the values stated, that the appraisals of 1912 and 1920, as of
March 1, 1923, be accepted as fixing values of equipment on March 1, 1913,
for purposes of subsequent depreciation, and that the returns for 1909 to
1912 be adjusted along the line above indicated.

Association of Certified Public Accountants of West Virginia
At the annual meeting of the Association of Certified Public Accountants
of West Virginia, held at Charleston, August 19, 1920, the following officers
were elected for the ensuing year: president, S. C. Board; vice-president,
David A. Jayne; secretary, William T. Green.

W. B. Castenholz draws attention to an error in the announcement rela
tive to his firm in the October issue of The Journal of Accountancy.
Offices of the firm are in Chicago, New York, Kansas City, Tulsa and
Houston.

William Dolge announces that he has admitted to partnership Benjamin
H. Hicklin and George E. H. Satchell. The firm name will be William
Dolge & Co., 311 California street, San Francisco, California.
H. Braverman and W. I. Smith announce the formation of a partner
ship, with offices in the Kinney building, Newark, New Jersey, and the
Bankers Trust Company building, Norfolk, Virginia.

S. W. Park announces the opening of an office at 3412 Woolworth
building, New York.
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